Contrasting Civilian and Military Martial Arts
One of my clubmates, John Durish, asked a great question to the club about the impact of Kunst des Fechtens masters on the huge changes in military organization known as…
One of my clubmates, John Durish, asked a great question to the club about the impact of Kunst des Fechtens masters on the huge changes in military organization known as “The Military Revolution,”[1] an increasing professionalization of armies in the 17th century, as well as the extent to which their teachings have impacted training and fighting in later periods. The question is great not because my answer is great, but because it touches on so many themes and ideas that I’ve been researching on my own.
To answer the question – I don’t know of any direct or indirect line of influence of KDF on the Military Revolution of the 17th century, or any later fighting styles, with some possible exceptions. While the Marxbruder and the Federfechter were supposed to have been around until the early 19th century, but there is no evidence that they had any influence on military thought or tactics. Alfred Hutton and Egerton Castle were historical fencers who studied a variety of fencing styles which may have influenced the instruction of their respective military units, but I’m not familiar with their knowledge of KDF in particular. In addition, their contributions to later military tactics, operations, or strategy are almost certainly negligible compared to the impact of Vegetius on Macchiavelli, Maurice of Nassau, or Gustavus Adolphus, or Euclid’s impact on Vauban.
With that said, there are many biographical details about the KDF masters that I simply don’t know, that could do with some extra scrutiny and research. For example, some masters may have had military experience (Kal) which may have allowed a fencing master to affect military training and doctrine. However, I’m hesitant to speculate about this type of transmission.
Civilian vs. Military Martial Arts
In general, there are huge differences between the civilian and military contexts in which one would be using or practicing a martial art. For civilians, these might include recreation, sport, self-defense, and duels, among other things. In these contexts, the use of arms almost completely defines the activity. In military contexts, though, martial arts are just one piece of the context of being a soldier. The ability to march, stay in formation, follow orders, and a variety of mundane tasks make up the vast majority of responsibilities of soldiers from antiquity to the modern era. (I won’t say more, as John is a Marine and knows far more about this than I do.)
In addition, the outcomes of most ancient to early modern battles were not decided by an aggregation of individual fights between soldiers, but the movements of large masses of men. To paraphrase Keegan, a battle between two armies was largely determined by which army routed first, and fled the battle, rather than which army was killed on the spot first. In these situations, the ability to stay in formation, stay calm, and follow orders far outweighs a soldier’s individual ability to kill or injure their opponents.[2]
Because of the many non-weapon related responsibilities of soldiers and the lack of importance of individual skill to the outcome of a battle, it appears that many martial arts practiced in a military context are much simpler than or are pared down versions of their civilian counterparts. For example, De Gheyn’s (1608) pike and arquebus manual,[3] used by Maurice of Nassau, only shows drill and manual of arms for pike, and does not discuss any of the more complicated pike fencing seen in an earlier civilian counterpart (Meyer). (I will discuss some of other visible differences in the next section on Angelo and Hutton.) In addition, many military martial arts consider situations that would be absurd for any civilian context. For example, an illustration from Wallhausen (1617) shows soldiers fighting with rapiers, while holding pikes. A plate from Bonaventuro Pistofilo (1621) shows the same situation, but also shows soldiers with swords fencing around an arquebus resting on its shooting stand. These types of scenarios are puzzling for a civilian context, but becomes obvious in a military context when considering a pikeman whose opponent has crossed his point, or an arquebusier who has spent his shot.
Bayonets and Swords in Civilian and Military Contexts
In reading the sword and bayonet manuals of Angelo and Hutton, I’ve noticed a few interesting differences between the two that might point to the contexts in which they were meant to be used. Broadly speaking, Angelo’s work sits in the mid 19th century where the muzzle-loading Enfield rifle was issued to British soldiers, and close combat was a distinct possibility. Hutton’s work lies at the end of the 19th century, where breech loading rifles such as the Martini-Henry and Lee-Metford rifles were issued, and close combat was less of a possibility.
Angelo’s Bayonet Exercise (1853, 1857), an official bayonet training booklet of the British Army, is an extremely simple system. For example, twelve of the twenty nine pages are used to instruct “bayoneteers” how to thrust in directions Low, Medium, High, and Vertical. Compound attacks and feints are mentioned but not taught, and the end section is filled with comically brief advice about fighting multiple enemies (keep them in front of you), fighting horsemen (stay on his left), and fighting lancers (stay on his right). One passage from Angelo reveals which element he believes is primary to winning a charge:
Although the solidity of a compact body of men is the primary and essential point in a charge, yet a melee invariably follows, where any resistance is made; and then which man has the advantage?…
Note that Angelo believes that it is primarily the formation of men, and not their individual prowess that determines the success of a charge, with individual skill being the secondary consideration that motivates the manual.
Hutton’s bayonet manuals are more complicated, and include compound attacks, feints, and the type of vocabulary that any gentleman fencer of the day would understand. In fact, Hutton’s Bayonet-Fencing and Sword-Practice (1882) spends its first two pages entreating the reader to learn smallsword, and spends a page discussing smallsword guards. The manual is littered with references that belie its recreational nature, such as “All hits above the knee are to be counted,” and “Players are strongly recommended to fence for a fixed number of hits, say, 3, 5, or 7; this increases interest in the play, and tends to make the men more careful about their fencing.” In Cold Steel (1890), Hutton concludes a sabre versus bayonet play with, “When the swordsman has succeeded in seizing the rifle he should only offer the cut or thrust, as it is a gross breach of good manners to strike a practically disarmed man, unless, of course, the bayoneteer attempts by struggling to regain control of his weapon.”
Overall, the differences between Angelo and Hutton suggest that Angelo’s audience was a soldier with limited time to train with a bayonet that expected to face a variety of threats on the battlefield, while Hutton’s audience was likely an officer that was fencing with a bayonet for recreation, and as a diversion from their usual sword and smallsword exercise. These differences in context can also help to explain the apparent disparity in their complexity.
Conclusion
To return to the original question about the potential impact of KDF on military thought, the main thrust of my argument has been that civilian martial arts tend to be more complicated than military martial arts. This makes it less likely that a deep fencing system (such as KDF) would be able to significantly affect a comparatively shallow military martial art. There is a large amount of biographical information about the masters that we don’t know, but for the reasons stated above, I am less inclined to believe that contact or military service per se results in a meaningful transmission of ideas to military martial arts.
Works cited
Roberts, Michael (1956), The Military Revolution, 1560–1660.
Keegan, John (1976), The Face of Battle.
De Gheyn (1608), Exercise of Arms.
Wallhausen (1617),
Pistofilo, Bonaventura (1621), Oplomachia.
Angelo, Henry Charles (1853) Bayonet Exercise; Angelo (1857) Bayonet Exercise New Edition.
Hutton, Alfred (1882), Bayonet-Fencing and Sword-Exercise.
Hutton, Alfred (1890), Cold Steel.
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