Spanish Army, 1910
The Spanish army and the Spanish soldier must claim attention in any study of home life in Spain, for the established order of political conditions owes much to both—they stand…
From: 1910 C.E. To: 1910 C.E.
Location: Spain
Note: This article has been excerpted from a larger work in the public domain and shared here due to its historical value. It may contain outdated ideas and language that do not reflect TOTA’s opinions and beliefs.
From Home Life in Spain by Samuel Levy Bensusan, 1910.
The Spanish army and the Spanish soldier must claim attention in any study of home life in Spain, for the established order of political conditions owes much to both—they stand between the Castiles and social upheaval. Not only is the loyalty of the army an asset upon which the Ruling House must depend for its continued existence, but there has always been a party or section of a party in high places that fears a really successful general almost as much as it fears the social revolution. General Valeriano Weyler, the strongest and most resolute soldier in his country's service, the Kitchener of Spain, was for some years credited with the power, if he but had the will, to proclaim a military dictatorship.
The Government relies upon the army but fears it as well, and consequently when Spain goes to war, the army, no matter who the nominal commander may be, is directed from Madrid, to the great confusion of the campaign. If the full history of the Spanish-American War is ever written, the force of these statements will be understood. The country has many men who combine the sardonic humour that is truly Spanish with the fatalism which has been imported from across the Mediterranean, and the outspoken comments that pass unchallenged upon the origin and conduct of recent campaigns afford perhaps the most damning expose of the Government system that could well be imagined. The recent struggle in the Riff country was associated with printed comment that no paper in England would publish.
Of the Spanish soldier it is difficult for a civilian to speak justly. In times of peace you notice a rather insignificant soldier, generally one of an undersized, unhealthy, and unattractive class of man that is the reverse of inspiring. But if you ask any unprejudiced observer who has seen the Spanish soldiers in the field, you will hear them very highly praised for bravery, endurance, good spirits, and other fine qualities.
It would seem then that "the piping times of peace" are bad for the Spanish soldier, his life is more or less dissipated, his discipline is lax, his requirements are badly looked after, and his contempt for civilians is an emotion he is at no pains to conceal. But in the field, as the great Napoleon learned to his cost, many Spanish soldiers are heroes, and for the veteran broken in the wars there can be no sentiments save of respect and compassion. For his Fatherland has little use for war's wastage, and hundreds of brave fellows who have served their country have returned to it broken in health and strength to find themselves no better off than the beggars on the highway. There is little reward for the rank and file in Spain, whether they serve in the stricken field or labour at the plough, theirs at best is "a broken day of sunshine and of showers, fading to twilight and deep night at last".
The Spaniard makes a good fighting man. He is brave. Under fire he is apt to lose his temper, and gain a fury that inspires him to acts of heroism. His enemies cannot boast that they have seen his back. Here again we have the instinctive spirit of individuality of the Spaniard, and the history of Spanish wars, whether civil, local, or national, are a record of the doings of individuals rather than masses.
In guerrilla warfare the Spaniard is, when ably led, a redoubtable opponent, hot-headed, and even ruthless to the verge of cruelty. The Carlist struggles in the North and the fighting in the Cuban swamps can supply all necessary confirmation here. A check maddens the Spanish soldier; if left to himself he would as a rule know no defeat. But moral encouragement is necessary for the Spaniard, and in default of this tonic he is easily depressed.
The organization of the army is not perfect; it is doubtless perfect in no land. Yet all things considered, the army is perhaps the best organized of all Spain's Government departments. This in itself is not saying very much, considering that Spanish political rule is a synonym for maladministration, but the organization of the small army that the King calls his own has at least the rudiments of thoroughness. Down to within a few years ago the relations between the military and political castes were both close and pronounced; the army and its whole administration were directly dependent on the Ministry of War which was, and still is, an assembly of politicians who have no practical acquaintance with service in the field.
Not only was this bad for the army in times of peace, it was worse in times of war, and the result of a dual control was that the war was generally disastrously led—and hopelessly lost. The commanding generals could take no step without first consulting the political authorities at home. The Cuban War was lost in this way, the subsequent debacle was due to it. Now the tendency is to remove the army almost completely from the influence of political incompetents, and with this object in view, a Superior Central Staff has been created under the direct supervision of the King. The Ministry of War has nothing to do with this Etat Majeur, although the Minister for War is a member. It is hoped by the new arrangements to avoid recurrence in future to political pronunciamientos under military control, and also to enable generals in time of war to carry out their own plans of action without having to be dependent upon the wishes of a number of unthinking, ignorant civilian officials housed in the War Office.
The life led by the Spanish soldier in times of peace is simple and rustic when compared with that led by those of other nations. Hygienic precautions have practically no place in the barracks, they are as scarce as provisions for the reasonable comfort of the men who serve. But then, and this must not be forgotten, the Spaniard is not degenerate or highly civilized, enough as yet to require all the comforts that are regarded as necessaries with us. If an Iberian boor were transplanted to a northern barracks, say in France or Germany, he would certainly feel ill at ease, he would think he had found luxuries.
So we must not be surprised to find that the Spanish soldier is not only reconciled to, but really likes both the general consideration and the fare that, with all due regard to economy, the Spanish authorities mete out to him. Nor is it surprising that after the quinto (recruit) has done five years' service in the army he should not be averse from joining the Guardia Civil or gendarmes, and serve another ten or twenty years in their ranks. His privileges, perquisites, and authority will all suffer change for the better.
The Guardia Civil is as stalwart and ruthless a body of organized men as is to be found between the north and south poles. Its creation was a stroke of statecraft, its management is an enduring tribute to the responsible parties. The members of this splendidly trained body are not policemen, they are not under the control of a provincial civil governor, but are under the military authorities. Their duty is to preserve order, and they fulfil their duty ruthlessly. Well mounted, carrying excellent carbines which they know how to use with the quickness and precision of a Western American, they are the sworn enemies of every disturber of the public peace, and are hated by all who consider that the Government then in power is playing with the rights of men and women. And as all Governments Spain has had within the past thirty years are bent upon so dealing with the governed, it stands to reason that the guardias are cordially hated by the forces which are rightfully or wrongfully opposed to constituted authority.
The corps is numerous, and the authorities are not renowned for moral or physical bravery in time of crisis. The result is that the guardias are to be seen everywhere with their black, white, and yellow uniform and three-cornered hats; their resolute action and their ready weapons are easily provoked. No train moves without the pareja (the term applies to a couple of gendarmes, they are never to be seen alone) in attendance.
There is no procession without its escort of guardias, no crowd can ever assemble without being intimidated by a host of these fierce expressions of a Government's fear of revolution. No bull-fight, no cock-fight, no merienda, no feria lacks its contingency of guardias. Spain is, to no small extent, ruled by them; without them dictators like ex-Premier Maura might well shiver in their shoes and yet be brave men.
Physically and personally they are a fine set of fellows— stalwart, sturdy, and brave. As a body they reflect small credit upon any country that boasts of a constitution, and whose King claims to be the "first citizen, soldier, and farmer in the realm".
The organization of the Guardia Civil as well as that of the whole army is naturally centralized in Madrid, and this concentration is perhaps the most powerful weapon with which the Government endeavours to combat the regionalism so strong in the Iberian Peninsula. If better results have not been obtained—and no small measure of success has been achieved—it is due to the fact that the members of the army and the Guardia Civil remain regionalists to the end of their days in spite of all endeavours made by the authorities to eradicate the local sentiment.
No body of Gallegos, Murcians, Sevillians, and Catalans can possibly be united by a uniform and a set of disciplinary regulations. Until a few years ago different recruiting laws existed in various provinces; these laws were remnants of the provincial fueros to conserve which the Spaniards fought for the greater part of the past century. The Carlist wars were, in fact, the struggle of the Basque Provinces, Navarre, Aragon, and Catalonia for the regional privileges that Don Carlos had sworn to preserve; the failure of the Pretender to assert his rights to the throne was characterized by the centralization of power in Castile and the unification of Spanish laws. It was the punishment of defeat.
Today, save in the Basque Provinces, the recruiting and other laws are uniform throughout Spain; while as far as military law in the Basque Provinces is concerned, it provides for the recruiting of soldiery as in all other provinces, but the recruits are not obliged to do their military service outside their own province. This significant State tribute to regionalism has been found indispensable.
The King has as bodyguard the Real Cuerpo de Guardias Alabarderos and a squadron of the Escolta Real. The uniform of the bodyguard on gala occasions is of a creamy white, and in winter the officers wear white capas.
Spain is divided into sixty-eight military zones and three naval zones, the latter being situate at Cadiz, Ferrol, and Cartagena. Since the American War the Spanish navy has been unimportant, but the country's reappearance in international politics since the marriage of King Alfonso, has induced the Government to open an important credit for the construction of a fleet to include one or two Dreadnoughts. British firms, in conjunction with Spanish ones, are constructing the new navy in the yards of Ferrol and Cartagena.
Like so many other Spanish laws, universal conscription exists in name only. As a matter of fact, it is only the poorer classes that have to serve, either three or two years in the active and as many again in the reserve. For the rich, should their sons draw a number which obliges them to serve, a substitute can be bought for £60, but this money does not go to the substitute but into the hands of the Government. The injustice of this procedure is only too apparent, but, although each new Minister of War upon whom depends the regeneration of the country's military organization has a brilliant scheme for the introduction of universal conscription, these schemes all come to an untimely end.
The Spanish army consists nominally, and on a peace footing, of 100,000 men (1907), and to this number must be added no less than 11,756 officers. The Guardia Civil, though standing as far as organization and discipline are concerned, under the Ministry of War, is placed really at the disposal of the Home Secretary. It consists of 20,000 men, and another 15,000 men are represented by the carbineers. But these figures are not accurate, they are written down on paper in the different Government offices. In reality, the number of soldiers falls below the figures given. When harvesting season comes round, for instance, it is doubtful whether many more than half the prescribed number of soldiers are serving under the flag.
Spain is divided into eight Captain-Generalships, each standing for an army corps of two divisions. The seventh and eighth army corps consist each only of one division, so that there are in all only fourteen divisions, to which one cavalry division stationed in Madrid must be added. At the head of each army corps there is a "Captain-General," corresponding to our Lieutenant-General.
The budgetary strength of a division is 6000 men, which can be increased to 16,000 in time of war. We thus obtain rather less than 90,000 men in time of peace, and on paper the numbers can be raised to 240,000 in time of war. The figures are of course more imposing than reliable.
A division consists of two infantry brigades, a cavalry regiment, two artillery regiments, and a regiment of pontoons, etc.
The infantry brigade contains two regiments to each two battalions; the cavalry regiment has four squadrons; the artillery regiment two divisions of three batteries each, each battery consisting of four guns. There are in all Spain 552 pieces of artillery (1908). A quick-firing division is being introduced, divided into two sections, each of which carry two Maxim or two Hotchkiss guns.
To the above must be added three brigades of Chasseurs, each brigade consisting of six battalions.
In time of peace there are 134 battalions, 58 "cuadros," 112 squadrons, 84 artillery batteries, and 52 technical companies. In time of war these figures are raised to 308 battalions, 168 squadrons, 84 batteries, and 70 technical companies. These figures are exclusive of the soldiery stationed on the Balearic and Canary Isles.
As far as Africa is concerned, the recent war and the new territory acquired by Spain will seemingly induce the Government to introduce reforms in their African fortresses.
Thus we read that the present plan of the Spanish Government is to increase the troops stationed at Melilla from 5000 to 12,000 men, and those at Ceuta from 3000 to 10,000 men as permanent garrisons. The North African possessions will, moreover, form a Captain-Generalship of their own, instead of being dependent on the Captain-General of the Campo de Gibraltar.
The strength of the army in time of peace is to be raised, dating from the coming year. If in the past few years it numbered anything from 80,000 to 100,000 men (or less), it is now to contain 126,000 men, namely:—
100,000 on the Peninsula.
4,000 on the Canary and Balearic Isles.
12,000 in Melilla.
10,000 in Ceuta.
126,000 in all.
An infantry regiment consists in Spain in time of peace of 519 men and 60 officers, and a battalion of about 275 men. The amount of superfluous officers is enormous when compared with the strength of the army. They number: 52 Colonels, 100 Lieutenant-Colonels, 420 Majors and 231 Captains.
In the field, the Spanish officer, like his men, commands respect. He has individuality and bravery. No doubt there is much to hope for from a Spanish army that is properly equipped and handled independently by the men on the spot. But it is impossible to overlook the frequent breakdown of commissariat that hinders a Spanish campaign, the supply of shells that will not explode, clothing that will neither fit nor wear, the absence of necessary stores and equipments, the faulty field hospitals, the lack, in critical hours, of medicines and surgical appliances.
The Spaniard goes cheerfully enough to war, for he is as brave a man as ever took arms in hand, but he knows his foes are not limited to the men he has to fight against. There are other foes he will never see, the men who draw money for feeding, clothing, tending, and arming him, and who regard a war as some beneficent scheme by which a kindly Providence has elected to fill their capacious pockets.
Patriotism is a quality that is ill-developed in the mind of the Government contractor, or it is unable to survive the claims made upon him by those but for whose power he would get no contracts.
Bensusa, Samuel Levy. Home Life in Spain. MacMillan, 1910.
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